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25

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NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE: THE WAY TO ACHIEVE COMMON SECURITY IN EUROPE

by Robert Neild

INTRODUCTION

For some time the idea has been discussed that security in Europe could be increased, East-West relations improved and the arms race eased if a new strategy was adopted for *non-nuclear* forces in Europe. The capacity of non-nuclear forces to go on the offensive would be minimized and their capacity to defend maximized.

Various labels have been attached to this idea—alternative strategy, non-provocative defence and non-offensive defence. I shall use the term non-offensive defence, since it most clearly and briefly conveys what the idea is all about.

Non-offensive defence has been gathering support in West Germany and other western European countries, principally amongst the social democratic parties. In that context, non-offensive defence has mostly been discussed as a one-sided policy: debate has concentrated on whether it would be possible for NATO to construct a sufficiently strong defensive force to be able to hold an attack by the Warsaw Pact with its existing, offensively oriented, force structure. The idea that the Warsaw Pact might also adopt a strategy of non-offensive defence has seemed remote and has scarcely been discussed.

Now all that may be changing. Mikhail Gorbachev and his new generation of advisers, besides radically rethinking how the political economy of the Soviet Union should be run, have also gone in for rethinking military strategy and have been voicing the idea of defensive non-nuclear defence. It is pretty clear that they have not yet converted the military to their new ideas but that a debate is going on, or possibly a struggle similar to the struggle with the bureaucracy over the introduction of new economic policies.

What we know in the public domain is that the Warsaw Treaty Organization produced an agreed statement in Budapest in June 1986 calling for far-reaching non-nuclear disarmament in Europe which included the statement that "... the military concepts and doctrines of the military alliances must be based on defensive principles."[1] Then in May 1987 in Berlin they produced a statement on military doctrine, signed by the leaders of the member states in which they proposed that consultations be held between the two alliances with the aim of comparing military doctrines and "... ensuring that the military concepts and doctrines of the military blocs and their members be based on defensive principles."[2] Coming from an alliance whose adherence to an offensive doctrine and structure for their non-nuclear forces has been a main cause of the confrontation in Europe, this is a remarkable change.

On its side, NATO, in Brussels December 1986, produced a declaration on arms control which proposed negotiations that should "focus on the elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large-scale offensive action."[3]

In March 1988 there were some new developments. First, the US Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, and the Soviet Minister of Defence, General Dmitri Yazov, met for two days of informal talks at Bern, during which the Soviet Minister is reported to have said, as regards defensive doctrine for non-nuclear forces, that there were going to be changes in Soviet training manuals and military exercises; the US Secre-

tary is reported to have said that he perceived no clear evidence of a change in actual force structure.

Second, both alliances issued agreed statements setting out their positions as they approached the Vienna talks on conventional (non-nuclear) forces. The NATO statement placed much emphasis on the need to achieve, by negotiation, a closer balance of forces, but also emphasized, as a matter of high priority, the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. The Warsaw Treaty Organization statement called for negotiated reductions in forces in the course of which existing imbalances would be eliminated, and it repeated the call for talks on defensive doctrine. So far the politicians and the public in many NATO countries seem to have little knowledge of Mr. Gorbachev's new position or of the issue of non-offensive defence as an alternative to present strategies. Wider understanding and more public debate of the possibilities is needed in both east and west. How does the present strategy of each side compare with a defensive strategy? How could a change to a defensive strategy be implemented?

PRESENT STRATEGIES

Since 1945, thinking about non-nuclear warfare in Europe has been dominated on both sides by the notion of mobile armoured warfare which was inherited from the Second World War.

Mobile warfare aims to produce great advances on land by tanks, self-propelled artillery and mechanized infantry, supported by aircraft, following either a successful surprise attack or an intense battle in which one side wears down the other, breaks out and then sweeps forward. Surprise attacks are associated principally with the early phases of the Second World War, notably Hitler's lightning wars (blitzkriegs) against Poland and France. The slogging matches are associated with the second phase of the war when the allies, with their superior combined economic and military force coming into play, were checking and pushing back the Germans. The Battle of Kursk on the Russian front, when thousands of tanks were employed on each side—and thousands were destroyed—is the epic example.

There were in fact long periods when the war was relatively static. The defensive, as always, enjoyed advantages. If defending forces were well-led and well-prepared, in particular if they were dug-in and were using mines and earthworks, they were hard to overcome. The attacker had to concentrate his forces, build up a large numerical superiority at one or more points and try to achieve surprise by manoeuvre and deception. The defender for his part needed to be able to manoeuvre his forces so as to meet the attacker, if possible by tempting him into a trap where he could be surrounded. There was a high premium on manoeuvre and surprise, hence on mobility. The aim was to have a decisive battle, achieve a decisive victory and sweep forward so fast that your opponent would be overwhelmed and demoralized.

These are the basic ideas, focused on the tank and other armoured fighting vehicles supported by aircraft, that have been carried forward, with modification, by both alliances.

This form of warfare relies on the internal combustion engine, and is being increasingly complicated and challenged in the era of electronics; the vehicles (tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, aircraft and ships) have become progressively more vulnerable to precision-guided munitions.

In fact the two sides are not symmetrical in terms of their force structures or their doctrines.

The Warsaw Pact appears to have numerical superiority in non-nuclear forces — though how much and what it is worth is debatable — and has had the doctrine until now that, if attacked, it would swiftly take the offensive. There are several plausible explanations for this doctrine. One is that after the war, faced by the Western nuclear monopoly and then nuclear superiority, the Soviets countered by going for conventional superiority in Europe so that they could hold Europe in pawn.

Another is that in drawing up contingency plans (which is the job of military staffs) for a non-nuclear war in Europe, the rational strategy for the Warsaw Pact was to plan to advance swiftly to the Atlantic before the United States, having mobilized its resources, could pour forces and supplies into Europe, as it did in the two world wars. Other explanations are that the Soviets have sought to avoid war flowing into their own territory, causing suffering as it did during the Great Patriotic War (their name for the Second World War); and that they seek to avoid war flowing into the countries of Eastern Europe whose loyalty is questionable.

These explanations are not mutually exclusive; they may all have been in play; and we cannot know their relative importance. But the Soviet emphasis on the offensive has been articulated in their military literature since the 1920s and has been visible in the structure, deployment and training of the Warsaw Pact's forces.

On the NATO side, the *character* of the forces is not very different from that of the Warsaw Pact. But, because the forces are weaker, the doctrine was designed to deter the Warsaw Pact from attack. It prescribes a spoiling battle to hold the Warsaw Pact and then a swift resort to the first use of nuclear weapons if NATO forces begin to be overrun.

The interaction of these two doctrines and postures has

been rather perverse. The first-use doctrine of NATO caused the Warsaw Pact to develop methods of fighting in a nuclear environment: they put men into armoured personnel carriers and worked out tactics for going hurriedly through irradiated areas, all of which made their forces look more mobile and menacing to NATO and seemed to confirm the need for the first-use doctrine to match the apparent threat. The fundamental problem, however, is that to rely on mobile armoured warfare to keep the peace — in Europe or anywhere else — is a strategy that is inherently unstable, in three ways.

First, there is crisis instability. The high premium on surprise attack means that in a crisis there is a temptation to attack before the other side attacks you, i.e., to carry out a pre-emptive strike. Knowledge that your opponent fears that you will attack him first, just as you fear that he will attack you first, intensifies the pressure to attack pre-emptively. That fear and pressure will be more intense the more each side has deployed vulnerable offensive forces that offer rich targets—for example, exposed aircraft on airfields or concentrations of tanks or other tracked or wheeled vehicles.

Second, there is escalation instability. If the strategy is to pursue decisive battle in a war of manoeuvre, the consequence is to maximize the probability that one side or other will be decisively defeated at the non-nuclear level and find that it must escalate to the use of nuclear weapons — or surrender.

Third, the more armed forces have an offensive capability the more it is necessary for each side to pursue a build-up in arms so as to keep matching the threatening arms of the other side. That is what generates an arms race.

Apart from these military consequences of possessing forces with a strong offensive capability, there are important political consequences. The sight of forces with an offensive capability will arouse fear, suspicion and hostility in the mind of your potential adversary. If your political aims are peaceful, it is a mistake to follow a strategy that induces hostility in your neighbour; it is more sensible to seek to reassure him by creating, if you can, the ability to defend yourself without creating the ability to attack him.

DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES

Could the strategies of either or both sides in Europe be made more defensive? In other words, is it possible to vary the strategy and nature of the non-nuclear forces in such a way as to vary their defensive capability relative to their offensive capability, and vice versa?

That there is scope for variation — though we cannot say precisely how much — is evident from the fact that we identify the strategy and forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization as being offensive; and we identify the strategy and forces of many of the neutral countries — for example, Switzerland or Yugoslavia — as being defensive, designed to ensure that if anyone attacked them they would get bogged down in a war of attrition. Further, it is clear that some weapons and some types of forces are more offensive than others.

The assessment of whether and how far the strategy and forces of a country have an offensive or a defensive capability is not just a matter, however, of trying to label weapons—though some weapons can be picked out as being items without which the armed forces of a nation or alliance would have little or no ability to attack. Rather it is a matter of judging the strategy and character of the forces of a country as a whole — their doctrine, training, equipment, weapons, deployment, logistics and everything else. That is what we do when we apply the label 'defensive' to the doctrine and forces of some neutral countries, and the label 'offensive' when we look at the doctrine and forces of the Warsaw Pact.

The main work that has been done on the technical possibilities of non-offensive defence has concentrated on land warfare, and has been concerned with the design of defensive belts of dispersed forces and the use of new kinds of weapons within these belts. An important question is to what extent you still need mobile armoured forces to engage the enemy where he makes progress through the defensive belt and to provide a capacity for counter-attack.[4]

This work has focused on the question of how far you could construct defensive forces which, while possessing limited offensive capability, would be able to hold an enemy and bog him down in a war of attrition, thus dissuading him from attack. The work has been done in the West — though, for all we know, similar work may have been going on in the East. It was usually based on the assumption, noted earlier, that a change towards non-offensive defence would be made by NATO alone. This was partly a point of logic — it made sense to explore how effective defences could be made against an uncooperative opponent; and it was partly a matter of political realism — there seemed little chance of a change being started by the Warsaw Pact. But since NATO was the weaker side with the less offensive posture, it was a tough case to argue. A few heretics within the military and ex-military in West Germany and other countries backed the idea, but the NATO military establishment dismissed as 'pie-in-the-sky' the notion that the one-sided adoption of non-offensive defence was consistent with the security of NATO. Since the military have a predilection for the offensive, their opposition was probably exaggerated; but whether well or ill-founded, the argument about the one-sided adoption of non-offensive defence ceases to have much

relevance when there is the possibility of a two-sided adoption of that strategy.

The main results of the work — and they are highly relevant to the two-sided adoption of non-offensive defence — were, first, that the scope for changing the character of forces so as to make them more defensive and less offensive is greatest with respect to land forces. In order to undertake an offensive on land, you require bridging equipment deployed forward, logistics to support a rapid and deep advance into enemy territory and training in this kind of warfare. For defence it is appropriate to have greater reliance on deep defensive belts, consisting of minefields, dispersed anti-tank forces and light infantry; and, depending on the size and character of your opponent's forces, you will need some mobile armoured forces to back up the defensive forces and provide a capacity for counter-attack.

On the other hand, the air and sea pose rather different problems. Aircraft and naval vessels, which are means of bombarding your opponent on land or at sea, are inherently offensive. It is hard to achieve effective defences against them except by using your own aircraft and warships to fight those of the other side. Ground-based anti-aircraft weapons and shore-based anti-ship weapons have improved, but they are still a rather limited form of defence against aircraft or warships. This being so, a main issue, if strategy in general is to be made more defensive, is how to reduce the size of navies and air forces.

The difference in this respect between land warfare and warfare in the air or at sea is probably being accentuated by the advance of technology. The increase in the accuracy and lethality of weapons resulting from precision-guided munitions puts a premium on shooting first and a diminishing premium on repeated fire by massed forces.

This means that technology may not be unfavourable to the defence on land, if there is enough natural or man-made cover for dispersed forces to be able to conceal themselves. In those circumstances, the attacker has to show himself in order to advance in a vehicle or on foot, and the defender may be able to pick him off from concealed positions. This applies, for example, to anti-tank weapons against tanks. On the other hand, air bases and naval vessels cannot be concealed at all effectively. The premium on shooting first therefore tends to go to the attacker.

The adoption of non-offensive defence by two opposed nations or alliances, where that is technically and geographically possible, will mean they can achieve *mutual defensive superiority*, i.e., a condition whereby each side has a defensive capability greater than its opponent's offensive capability. Where one side has a strong offensive capability, the achievement of this condition may be possible if that side reduces its offensive strength (so improving the security of its opponent) and increases its defensive strength to the extent necessary to preserve its own security. But except in cases of great asymmetry —not the case in Europe — the usual aim must be to generate moves by both sides towards defensiveness. Mutual defensive superiority is the aim to be achieved by non-offensive defence.

The consequences of moving towards mutual defensive superiority are:

a) Crisis stability is increased. The pressure to pre-empt goes down as the offensive capability of your opponent goes down: if he cannot attack you, you do not feel pressure to rush to attack him as a preventative measure. And there will be further improvement if vulnerable rich targets are replaced by invulnerable dispersed forces. By and large, offensive forces offer vulnerable targets: e.g., airfields and concentrated tank parks. Defence can rely more on dispersed forces.

b) The risk of escalation is reduced. The more defensive strength is increased relative to offensive strength, the greater the ability of each side to hold an attack by the other. In order to promote escalation stability, the aim in a nuclear setting should be to avoid decisive battle and try to bring fighting to a standstill, to generate a stalemate, and then solve whatever crisis has occurred by political means.

c) If defensive strength is increased relative to offensive strength, a cumulative process can be started towards lower arms expenditures: a virtuous circle in place of a vicious one.

It is important to note that the application of non-offensive defence to non-nuclear forces in Europe would diminish the risk of nuclear war. A plausible scenario for nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union is that they get engaged in a confrontation outside Europe, for example, in the Persian Gulf; that they then put their forces on alert as part of the process of challenging each other to back down; and that in Europe, where the forces of the two sides stand eyeball-to-eyeball, fighting develops and, as a result of crisis instability, escalates. If non-offensive defence were introduced at the non-nuclear level, this risk would be diminished. Indeed, if the Warsaw Pact and NATO adopted non-offensive defence, first use of nuclear weapons by NATO would become a theoretical notion, whatever was said about it formally. Thus nuclear weapons might be pushed into the background as non-nuclear strategy was made defensive.

IMPLEMENTATION

The problem is how to get movement towards

defensiveness going between the two sides. So long as some forces or weapons or deployments have greater offensive capability than others, the removal of the more offensive constituents will contribute to the achievement of mutual defensive superiority. If both sides, and in particular the one with the more offensive posture, move in this direction a cumulative process may be started in which threatening postures are reduced, security improved and arms levels decreased.

There are three possible methods of implementing a switch from one strategy to the other: by independent actions, consultation and traditional negotiation.

An independent act means that one side directly changes the level and characteristics of its actual or planned forces.

Consultation means discussing with your opponent, and discussing in domestic forums he can observe, the logic and merits of a defensive strategy and taking those steps that appear to enhance your mutual security, urging him to do likewise. This could be described as positive dialogue; one side says, "I am unilaterally going to undertake these steps that will make us both more secure; I suggest you take those steps." The exchange is primarily informative and persuasive in design.

Negotiation means attempting to strike bargains in which a change in arms policy is made conditional on a change by the other side, on the grounds that it is not safe to modify your posture unless your opponent reciprocates by doing likewise. This could be described as negative dialogue; one side says, "I will not do this unless you do that," thus putting both sides into adversarial postures.

It is rational to take independent actions insofar as they increase your security on a short and long view, or at least maintain it at an adequate level even if the other side does not make a change: there is no sense in not doing things that are in your own best interest. Independent moves will be possible where (a) you possess more offensive forces than you need and can simply cut them and (b) you can, at reasonable cost, substitute defensive for offensive forces.

It is also rational to engage your potential opponent in a discussion about alternative strategies so as to try to make him understand what you are doing and persuade him to do likewise. The talks between the two alliances on doctrine might fulfil this role.

It will be felt that it is not possible to move without an assurance of reciprocity where you have offensive weapons for which no effective defensive substitute is possible—for example, aircraft and warships. Therefore, in these cases you will probably need to negotiate. That does not mean you should attempt to review and categorize *all* weapons, defining them as defensive or offensive, or more or less defensive or offensive on some scale. That is a hopeless exercise. Rather you need to pick out some obviously offensive categories of weapons, or potentially offensive deployments of forces, and negotiate their reduction or elimination by both sides. This might be done in the proposed negotiations to eliminate the capacity for surprise attack.

That it is possible, when the political will is there, to pick out the most offensive weapons or deployment, and agree to do without them, has been demonstrated in post-war history. One example is the Middle East peacekeeping arrangement on the Golan Heights which includes a wholly demilitarized zone and then surrounding buffer zones in which offensive weapons are limited. The zones are policed by the United Nations. The regime has been in operation, successfully, since 1974. Another is the treaty between the United States and Taiwan under which the United States agrees to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons only.

It would be a mistake to think that one can proceed only by traditional negotiation and use that method where unilateral changes would be possible. Negotiation of arms reductions rests on the assumption that the weapons or forces you are dealing with are inherently offensive so that balance is needed and shifts towards defensiveness are impossible. And it is a highly adversarial procedure, likely to cause trouble and frustrate progress from the start. If it is not guarded against, the armies of experts, politicians, bureaucrats and military advisers who have spent years in and around the negotiating arenas, will be all too likely, if the notion of defensiveness is adopted, to grab it and run with it into their negotiating chambers where they will wrangle and bicker over definitions, numbers and verification, as they have done in traditional arms control negotiations. The extent to which the statements by both sides about the Vienna talks on conventional forces, quoted earlier, concentrate on traditional negotiation is rather disturbing. The successful adoption of non-offensive defence requires that the use of adversarial negotiating procedures be minimized and that mutually reassuring and cooperative behaviour be progressively developed.

The kind of practical approach one wants to see in Vienna has two ingredients:

1. The first step is to pick out and agree on the key components of today's forces, the radical reduction or removal of which by both alliances will most greatly reduce their offensive capabilities and thereby increase stability. For example, will not the removal by both sides of tanks, heavy artillery, attack aircraft and missiles of more than battlefield range produce a collapse in offensive capabilities relative to defensive capabilities? Will not the removal of tanks alone achieve this in large measure, perhaps decisively? And are there other steps that might be helpful, for example, the establishment of frontier zones in which there are

limits on the deployment of offensive forces, the storage of ammunition, bridging equipment and other logistics needed for offensive operations. But the aim must be to pick out as few elements as possible, just the one or two that are most important, so as to cut through the logjam of resistance and obfuscation that will be thrown up by all those whose lives are built round the existing military structures and arms control rituals.

2. Once the key items have been picked out, the question to be addressed is to what level should the quantity of a chosen item, for example, tanks, be cut in order to achieve security? Should the figure be zero or should it be 5,000 or some other number from the Atlantic to the Urals? The focus should be on the target numbers required to produce greater stability, and agreement should be framed round those target numbers. Discussion of present numbers and the question of whether there is a balance should be avoided like the plague, since it is bound to produce interminable wrangling over unmeasurable differences in quality, age, location and other variables. The talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) are a warning: after nearly fifteen years of negotiation and more than 450 meetings these talks have produced no agreement. If the focus is on the target level, present numbers are relevant only to the question of how many weapons or forces should be scrapped. The same principle applies to the deployment of forces and logistics: the focus should be on the number and dispositions that will create stability, not on the present balance.

THE CHOICE

If the aims of a nation or alliance are offensive then clearly it must go for offensive superiority. That, for example, is what Hitler did. On the other hand, if your aims are peaceful, there are, as noted earlier, two methods by which you can try to achieve security. One is by having offensive forces with which to deter, meaning frighten, your opponent and so dissuade him from attack. The other is by going for defensive forces (supposing always that there is a choice), so that by achieving defensive superiority you deny your opponent the prospect of attaining his objectives and so dissuade him from attack, whilst alarming him as little as possible — indeed whilst seeking to reassure him.

If you go for offensive forces — or all-round forces of mixed capability — you are likely to alarm your enemy, however much you tell him that your intentions are peaceful. He can never rely 100 percent on any statement of intentions you make. For your intentions may change, or your statement of them may be dishonest, or you may be replaced by someone with different intentions. Your military capabilities, on the other hand, cannot quickly be changed, and have only limited ambiguity. They are therefore likely to have an important effect on your opponent's perceptions of your aims and on his reactions. You are unlikely to achieve reconciliation, mutual trust and peaceful relations so long as your doctrines and forces have an offensive character.

The decision whether a nation or alliance goes for offensive or defensive doctrines and forces will be subject to complex political influences and pressures. Some arguments will be based on inherited ideas about how to fight wars and how to dissuade your neighbour from attack, expounded by groups who have bureaucratic, economic and professional interests in the existing way of doing things. Other viewpoints, rooted in an opposition to the *status quo*, will be put forward by those who oppose existing policies on moral and other grounds. It is important to look at the alternatives from above and ask how the alternative non-nuclear strategies — more defensive or more offensive — are related to the political aims you might pursue.

You should go for defensive strategies if your aims are peaceful, but what are peaceful aims? The first meaning is that you do not seek to acquire territory. Non-offensive defence fits well with that aim. But suppose that while you do not wish to acquire territory from your neighbour, you nevertheless wish to keep up a confrontation with him in order to put economic pressure on him or cause him to squander his technological resources in the development of weapons, or in order to arouse your own people. Then clearly you will have to go for offensive forces. It is only if your intentions are wholly peaceful — not only do you not want his territory but you also wish to avoid an arms race in order to avoid putting pressure on his economy — that you will go for the posture of non-offensive defence. In other words, the adoption of non-offensive defence in place of a more offensively-orientated strategy fits a broad change in political aims in which reassurance and more cooperative relations are sought, in place of military and economic confrontation.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Gorbachev has signalled that he seeks the adoption of non-offensive defence. That this is his aim was made clear in a reply that he sent to a letter from a group of four western analysts, including the author, in which he stated that the Soviet Union seeks "reasonable sufficiency" of armed forces and armaments and went on to say that:

> The path towards the realization of reasonable sufficiency we see in governments not having more military strength and armaments than is necessary for their reliable defense, and also in their armed forces being structured in such a way that they will

provide all that is needed for the repulsion of any possible aggression but could not be used for offensive purposes.[5]

His pronouncements in favour of non-offensive defence must be read as a signal that he wants a change of strategy not only to improve military security directly but as part and parcel of an easing of political tensions. It is an action that fits that aim; and he has said in speeches that that is his aim. This is what makes his initiative so interesting. Of course, he may fail; he may be thrown from power. But how the West reacts to his initiative is one of the factors that will influence his survival and the policies he is able to follow. Obviously the West should not proceed in such a way that, if he did not succeed in implementing his policy of defensiveness, we would be vulnerable. But the very nature of a change towards non-offensive defence is that it does not compromise your security. You can proceed by independent acts and reciprocal measures that maintain or enhance your security as you go.

NOTES

1. Press Release Number 273, 13 June 1986, of the Permanent Mission of the Soviet Union, citing a Tass message from Budapest, 11 June 1986, headed "Address of Warsaw Treaty Member States to NATO Member States, to all European Countries with a Programme of Reducing Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments in Europe."

2. Press Release PR56587, 29 May 1987, The USSR Embassy, London, citing a Tass message from Berlin, 29 May 1987, headed "Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee — Military Doctrine."

3. *NATO Documentation*, "Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control by Ministers at the North Atlantic Council Session," issued as an attachment to the North Atlantic Council Communiqué following the Ministerial Session of 11 and 12 December 1986.

4. Horst Afheldt, *Pour une défense non-suicidaire en Europe*, Éditions la Découverte, Paris, 1985 (a translation of Horst Afheldt's *Defensive Verteidigung*, Rowohlt Taschenbuch, Hamburg, 1983; no English translation is available); Horst Afheldt, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons and European Security," in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Taylor & Francis, London, 1978 (the only major work of Afheldt's available in English); Guy Brossollet, *Essai sur la non-bataille*, Éditions Belin, Paris, 1975; Jochen Loser, *Weder rot noch tot*, Gunter Olzog Verlag, Munich, 1981; *Defence Without the Bomb: The Report of the Alternative Defence Commission*, Taylor & Francis, London, 1983.

5. Letter from Mikhail Gorbachev, Moscow, 16 November 1987, reproduced in *FAS Report*, Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, vol. 41, no. 2, February 1988.

FURTHER READING

Much of the literature is scattered in conference papers and in rather obscure journals and a good deal of it is in German. An International Research Newsletter on Non-Offensive Defence has been produced for a few years by the Centre of Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Copenhagen, Vandkunsten 5, DK 1467, Copenhagen K, Denmark. The newsletter has included as a special issue a bibliography on alternative defence that is extremely useful; and each issue contains book reviews and a listing of new books and articles.

The following general works may be useful though they generally analyze only the one-sided adoption of non-offensive defence:

Hylke Tromp (ed.), *Non-Nuclear Defence in Europe*, Groningen University Press, Netherlands, 1986.

Frank Barnaby, and Marlies Ter Borg (eds.), *Emerging Technologies and Military Doctrine: A Political Assessment*, Macmillan, London, 1986.

Derek Paul (ed.), *Defending Europe: Options for Security*, Taylor & Francis, London, 1985 (see, in particular, the contribution on "Non-Offensive Defence in Europe" by Anders Boserup).

An outspoken critique of one-sided non-offensive defence is to be found in David Gates, *Non-Offensive Defence: A Strategic Contradiction?*, Occasional Paper No. 29, Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, London, 1987.

Excellent historical studies of the role of the defence and offense are: Basil H. Liddell-Hart, *Deterrent or Defence: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position*, Stevens and Sons, London, 1960; and George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System*, Wiley, New York, 1977.

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